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CHEVRON, AND BEYOND THE INFINITE: THE JUDICIAL
AND LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Shane LaBarge†

“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”
—James Madison, Federalist No. 47

Princeps, Senator, Consul, Censor, Proconsul, Pontifex Maximus,
Imperator, Tribune.
—Eight distinct positions of executive, judicial, and legislative power
during the Roman Republic. Caesar Augustus assumed all eight positions
in his lifetime and this is generally cited by historians as the end of the
Roman Republic.

“Fools ignore complexity. Pragmatists suffer it. Some can avoid it.
Geniuses remove it.”
—Alan Perlis
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................109
I.INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................110
A. Background .........................................................................................110
B. Summary of Argument ........................................................................112
C. Road Map ............................................................................................113
II.CHEVRON DEFERENCE: ORIGIN, EXPLANATION, AND RATIONALES ....................115

† J.D. candidate 2018, Notre Dame Law School. I would like to thank the Executive Board of Volume
43 for selecting this Note for publication, the Editors of Volume 44 for making it readable, and the bureaucrats
of the administrative agencies who made this Note possible. I couldn’t have done it without your hard work.
Thank you.

107

108

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 44:1]

A. Political Origins ..................................................................................115
B. Rationales for the Administrative State ..............................................116
1. Flexibility ......................................................................................117
2. Agency Expertise ..........................................................................118
3. Political Accountability .................................................................121
4. Implicit Delegation ........................................................................122
III.KING V. BURWELL, AND THE UNWORKABILITY OF THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE ..........................................................................................................123
A. Background and Explanation of Affordable Care Act Legislation .....124
B. The Majority Opinion: Unworkability, and the Implications on Precedent
.......................................................................................................126
IV.CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................................128

Journal of Legislation

109

ABSTRACT
The modern administrative state operates as a shadow legislature, lacks political
accountability, and has become the primary source of law in the United States. These
laws are not created and enforced by the mechanisms of bicameralism and
presentment mandated by our Constitution. Instead, these laws are created in an
opaque process involving technocrats, special interest groups, and constantly
shifting policy agendas. Political debate is relegated to the “comments” section of
administrative actions. Questions of deep political and economic significance are in
the hands of the administrative agencies. There have been several judicial and
legislative push-backs against the administrative state, but this Note argues that the
Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017 (“REINs”)1
accomplishes the most effective restoration of constitutional balance and political
accountability to our government. This Note advocates that challenging the
administrative state generally, and REINs specifically, should be a bipartisan effort.
As a nominal creature of the executive branch, the administrative state defies
oversight from any branch of government and any political process. First, the
executive branch cannot properly oversee its agencies. Even a president entering
the White House with reformist goals must deal with a bureaucracy staffed by career
officials, and with an entrenched institutional memory of independence. And,
perhaps worse, a president may enter the White House viewing the administrative
state as an efficient means to accomplish policy goals that are currently stymied by
the political process or held up in Congress. In this scenario, the executive branch
is empowered at the expense of the legislative branch. Congress and the political
process have been victims of an end-run. A short-cut.
Second, no solution comes from the federal judiciary. The Supreme Court of the
United States held in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.2 that administrative agencies are free to implement the statutes that supposedly
guide their actions subject only to highly deferential review by the courts. The Court
in Chevron rightly feared the absence of democratic legitimacy and separation of
powers issues inherent in unelected federal judges guiding the implementation of law
and exercising what is effectively legislative power. Despite these valid concerns,
the Court did not settle the underlying issues. Chevron’s legacy is that unelected
federal officials of the executive branch, called “administrators,” exercise legislative
power, rather than judges. This exacerbates the problem, avoids the political
process, and acquiesces to a system in which Congress loses legitimate legislative
power.
There have been three recent challenges to the administrative state; two came
from Congress and one came from the Supreme Court. The challenge from the
Supreme Court and one challenge from Congress aimed at restoring oversight of the
administrative agencies to the federal judiciary. The challenge from the Supreme
Court came from the decision in King v. Burwell. The Court held that the high level
of deference accorded to administrative agency interpretations of their governing
1 H.R. 26, 115 Cong. (2017).
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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statutes would not extend to questions of “deep” economic or political significance.
This decision is a tacit acknowledgement that administrative agencies are exercising
legislative power, and those administrative decisions that most resemble legislation
may be reviewed by the judiciary.
The first challenge from Congress is the Separation of Powers Restoration Act
(“SOPRA”).3 It is legislation that would completely remove Chevron deference for
all administrative decisions, not just those of “deep” significance. This would
certainly roll-back the independent power of the administrative agencies, but would
bring back the very concerns that caused the establishment of Chevron deference in
the first place: the lack of political legitimacy and expertise that courts have when
they form policy from the bench.
The final challenge from Congress is REINs. This Note argues that REINs is the
most legitimate and desirable answer to the administrative state. The challenges to
the administrative state in King v. Burwell and in SOPRA take legislative power from
the executive and give it to the judiciary, all while ignoring the obvious answer:
legislative power belongs in the legislature. REINs ensures that Congress must
approve all major regulations, which opens it up to criticism on governmental
inefficiency. If this criticism is valid, then the American people should rightly reject
REINs and their votes during congressional elections will reflect this. The political
process and democratic legitimacy have been restored. Currently, if administrators
formulate rules that the American people reject, there is no political recourse.
A key point to this Note is that rolling back the administrative state is not and
should not be a partisan issue. King v. Burwell was penned by the liberals on the
court. Chevron deference was born from a majority decision consisting of both
liberals and conservatives. Justices Roberts and Alito made use of Chevron
deference during their careers at the Department of Justice. Conservatives were
angered during the Obama presidency by administrative fiat; and now liberals are
similarly angered. It is in the long-term interest of both parties to roll-back the
administrative state.
A change is needed, and REINs is that change. To continue to allow the
proliferation of law-making from institutions far removed from the very people that
these laws affect would be a grave mistake.
I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Background

In 2015 the Federal Register was 81,405 pages, contained 40,500,500 words, and
recorded 3,378 rules.4 These rules governed issues ranging from the esoteric, to the
technically complex, to the undeniably petty.5 In the thousands of pages of the

3 H.R. 76, 115th Cong. (2017).
4 Regulatory Statistics, COLUMBIAN C. OF ARTS & SCIS., https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
5 James L. Gattuso, Ten Worst Regulations of 2015, THE HERITAGE FOUND., (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/10-worst-regulations-2015.
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Federal Register, you will find not just regulations controlling what individuals can
and cannot do,6 but also critical decisions on how major issues of policy or authority
will be handled in the United States.7 For example, the 2015 Federal Register gave
the American people the definition of the ‘waters’ of the United States. In the
process, it also expanded the jurisdiction of the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Army Corps of Engineers over those ‘waters’ to 20 million acres of wetland
and 2 million miles of streams.8 In the Net Neutrality Order, the nature of the internet
was decided for us. The internet is actually now a utility, and as such is open to the
same price, content, and service controls that your electricity and water providers
are.9 The rules just mentioned are two of many given to us by administrative agencies
that are not minor regulations, or even major regulations, but instead are decisions of
policy, deciding the strategic direction that this nation takes. These regulations have
supplanted acts of Congress as the dominant law of the land. The powers of the
legislative and executive branches are not separated, but rather concentrated. The
judiciary has effectively abdicated its oversight of this new source of laws via a
common law doctrine of deference established by the Court.10 The administrative
state is firmly ensconced.
In 2015 the United States Congress passed 113 measures that have been signed
into law, making the U.S. Congress ninety-percent less active than regulatory bodies,
which enacted 3,378 major regulations.11 Many of the measures passed by Congress
were recurring measures that provided funding to the previously mentioned and very
active regulatory agencies, or otherwise transferred more power to the executive
branch.12 A notable piece of congressional legislation from 2015 is the cleverly
named SPACE Act—the Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and
Entrepeneurship Act of 2015.13 This Act allows for the commercial exploitation of
space resources, such as those that may be found on asteroids.
The dichotomy between the scale and scope of the acts of Congress, and the scale
and scope of the acts of regulatory bodies, is striking. The number of very significant
rules promulgated in 2015 by regulatory bodies—rules with an economic effect
greater than $100,000,000—is over three times the total number of acts signed by
Congress in that same year (counting acts such as Pub.L. 114-20, which renamed a
courthouse in Pittsburgh14, and its eighty-two sister acts which served to rename
buildings and facilities after eminent or well-regarded citizens).

6 Id.
7 Id. Minimum wage in certain contexts increased to $15.00 per hour; heavy coal regulatons aimed to
phase out the industry; mandatory birth control insurance.
8 Id.
9 COLUMBIAN C. OF ARTS & SCIS., supra note 1.
10 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
11 COLUMBIAN C. OF ARTS & SCIS., supra note 1.
12 See, e.g., the Trade Preferences Extension Act, which restarted the impermanent grant of enhanced
power to the president while negotiating trade deals.
13 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90 §101, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
14 Pub. L. No. 114-20, 129 Stat. 217 (2015).
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Summary of Argument

This Note’s leading assertion is simple: the current arrangement of power, where
regulatory bodies nominally acting under the authority of the executive branch have
taken legislative power from the U.S. Congress and are acting as the primary
legislature, is untenable. The regulatory agencies act as the maker and enforcer of
the laws. Further, the common law doctrine of Chevron deference has removed the
judiciary from the equation. In short, executive and legislative powers have
concentrated in one institution, and this institution is given large deference by the
judiciary. Congress’s acquiescence accomplished this informal, institutional
arrangement and, consequently, is now liable for very little. Legislation has become
optional for accomplishing most political goals and is only needed for the most
extensive public programs (such as the Affordable Care Act15) or when political
grandstanding calls for it16 (such as to name the Bison as the national mammal of the
United States).17
This Note argues that this arrangement is undesirable for lack of democratic
legitimacy, dearth of constitutional support; and lack of individual and collective
accountability. Despite the issue of regulatory bodies appearing at first glance as a
partisan issue because of the outspokenness of conservatives and members of the
Republican Party, it is not. The party that currently does not control the Presidency
is the party that is most incentivized in the short-term to agitate the exercise of
sweeping administrative power (as is evinced by Justices Alito and Roberts, two
critics of administrative power from the bench, but who regularly invoked Chevron
deference while working in George H.W. Bush’s Justice Department).18 Much like
executive orders, administrative regulations may be seen by a political party as being
an expedient means to accomplish policy goals while bypassing Congress. This same
political party may be horrified, however, when they lose the White House and
suddenly the same sweeping regulatory power they embraced as a means to an end,
is being used to further policies that they abhor, with no recourse found in Congress.
Instead, the recourse lies in the twice-a-decade election of a single candidate. This
candidate then has to deal with an entrenched and recalcitrant bureaucracy that has
served multiple presidents before him or her, and agencies and commissions that have
a high autonomy.

15 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. (2012).
16 The bill’s sponsor, Senator John Hoeven, had this to say about the bill: “Both the Senate and the House
have now passed the National Bison Legacy Act, which names this noble animal as our national mammal. This
is a fitting designation that recognizes the important cultural and economic role the bison has played in our
nation’s history.” Press Release, Office of Congressman Wm. Lacey Clay, U.S. Congress Passes Clay’s
Legislation Recognizing Bison as National Mammal of the United States (Apr. 27, 2015). Fans of bisons
celebrated when the bill passed, as did the Vote Bison Coalition, which included Cibola Farms, Cowtown
Cowboy Outfitters, and Montour Grill—all of which concerned themselves primarily with the skinning, tanning,
and eating of the noble mammal.
17 National Bison Legacy Act, NEWSMAX, (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.newsmax.com/TheWire/nationalbison-legacy-act-signed-obama/2016/05/10/id/728138/.
18 Jeffrey Toobin, Did John Roberts Tip His Hand?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/did-john-roberts-tip-his-hand.
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Using regulatory bodies to enact what should be sweeping legislations is a sloppy
and dangerous shortcut. It undercuts both political parties’ goals in the long run, and
circumvents the basic political processes of bicameralism and presentment laid out
in the Constitution. This political process is replaced with an administrative state that
is responsible for the legislation, interpretation, and enforcement of the laws of the
United States.
Even when Congress and the White House are unified under a single party, the
administrative state facilitates a laundering of responsibility for government policies
by politicians in Congress. For instance, a new U.S. president uses regulatory
channels to enact a series of severe, wide-ranging immigration reforms. It never goes
before Congress, and members of Congress up for re-election in moderate
jurisdictions may simultaneously disown and own the immigration reform. By never
having to vote, they receive a windfall for being able to deny that they ever supported
such legislation and that they disagree with the president, all the while receiving the
benefits of continuing to be a member of the very party that promulgated it. This
distorts the process of democratic consent and blurs these members’ true positions.
A yes, no, or abstention is a singular response to a proposed law. It must be defended,
retracted, or explained. When the default is “I don’t decide that,” despite the fact that
Congress’ role is to decide issues, then the value of the institution becomes
questionable. This is frightening because Congress is the institution most closely
aligned with the democratic will of the people, and its value has become
questionable.19
C. Road Map
This Note will first analyze the rationales behind Chevron deference, which also
served as justifications for embracing an administrative state largely independent of
the judiciary. Chevron did not establish a unifying rationale, and for decades the
Court lacked one, until the implicit delegation rationale was embraced in United
States v. Mead Corp.20 This Note will also analyze critiques and alternative
rationales. Ultimately, this Note will reject some of these rationales as being
illegitimate for balance of power concerns, and as being undesirable for reasons of
political accountability. This Note does not reject that the rationales behind Chevron
were proper concerns, only that the proper solution should come from the legislative
branch, not the executive, or the judiciary, as King v. Burwell21 would have it.
This Note is not the sole challenge to the administrative state; several other
prominent challenges have come from the legislative and judicial branches of the
United States government and will be analyzed. This Note will look at these
challenges, present their weaknesses and strengths, and then provide tentative
recommendations.

19 Congress and the Public, GALLUP NEWS, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx, (last
visited Jan. 11, 2017). Congressional approval rating consistently beneath Twenty Percent.
20 522 U.S. 218 (2001).
21 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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The first challenge has its origins in Congress and attacks one of the primary
enablers of the administrative state: the Supreme Court precedent known as Chevron
deference, which allows administrative agencies to essentially interpret their
‘governing’ statutes for themselves. The Separation of Powers Restoration Act aims
to nullify this doctrine and restore greater judicial oversight of regulation. A more
aggressive legislative move, the Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny
Act, has passed the House and would block any and all regulation having an
economic impact greater than $100,000,000 and put it before Congress for approval.
Ultimately, this Note recommends that any enactment of SOPRA is inadequate
without a simultaneous enactment of REINs. This will prevent the Court from
effectively deciding an issue of significant political importance and cost that is, in
reality, a piece of political legislation, despite the Court having low levels of
democratic legitimacy and life-time tenure (and thus limited accountability).
The Note will next analyze the recent Supreme Court decision in King v. Burwell,
where the Court appeared to be moving away from the Chevron doctrine by
suggesting a possible weakening of the doctrine from the bench. King v. Burwell will
also be used to illustrate the illegitimacy and unworkability that a restoration of more
readily available judicial review of regulation would have without REINs also being
passed. Instead of unelected administrators being the sole sources of law in the land,
equally unelected judges with life tenure would now be added to the process. Judicial
review may be seen to rightfully act as a check for regulations that are of insignificant
effect, described as less than $100 million (as REINs puts it), or as not having a
“deep” significance22 (as the Court in King v. Burwell puts it). The question of
clarifying deeply significant regulation, however, would still fall to federal courts. If
this were to occur, much of what led to the passing of Chevron deference in the first
place, and much of what was highlighted in the confused parsing of King v. Burwell,
would become the vehicle for lawmaking in this country. Unilateral administrative
action would be supplemented by endless litigation at different tiers of government,
with seemingly every government official except members of Congress weighing in.
With Chevron deference removed either by SOPRA or by Court ruling, and REINs
not passed, the judiciary would be added to the shadow legislature of executive
branch administrative bureaucrats. Legislative power would then have concentrated
in exactly every branch of government that is not supposed to concern itself with
lawmaking—an absurd result.
As the Court and bureaucracies decide, the laws of the United States Congress
will rename post offices, designate official animals, and—only when politically
expedient—step up to pass real legislation that, under the current order, could likely
have been accomplished via administrative order in the first place.

22 Id. at 2483.
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II. CHEVRON DEFERENCE: ORIGIN, EXPLANATION, AND RATIONALES
A.

Political Origins

In 1984 the Supreme Court decided the seminal case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,23 which ensconced the deference lower
courts must give to administrative agencies. The case addressed whether or not it
was permissible for the Court to impose its own construction of an issue that the
governing statute was either silent on or ambiguous towards over the construction of
the agency that administers the statute. In the case, the key ambiguity was the word,
“source,” with at least two possible interpretations, each of which carried with it an
economic and environmental effect.24 The question presented to the Court was
whether or not the Court or the administrative agency could decide which
interpretation to use. Justice Stevens held that the court’s construction of an issue
arising from silence or ambiguity would not take precedence over the administering
agency’s construction, so long as the construction is permissible. Thus, a twoquestion test was laid out for courts reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute
it administers: first, whether Congress has directly spoken to the question at issue,
and second, if not, whether the agency’s construction is permissible.25
Several facts are worth pointing out about the Chevron decision: the rule-change
from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) as to the definition
of “source” came after Republican Ronald Reagan was elected president;
conservative justices on the court supported the decision; and Chevron never fully
established the dominant rationale behind the deference given to administrative
agencies.26 As judicial and legislative challenges to Chevron arise, it should be noted
that these challenges seem to operate on partisan lines. Republican congressmen tend
to support SOPRA and REINs, and conservative justices tend to more strongly
support scaling back Chevron. The recent push-back from modern conservatives
comes not from a place of integral ideological revulsion—as evidenced, again, from
Justice Alito’s and Robert’s repeated use of Chevron while employed by the
Department of Justice27–but from a place of oppression; the opposing party has
controlled the executive branch for eight years. Administrative regulations were
enacted throughout the Reagan and Bush administration, and defended on Chevron
grounds.28 In short, the party that is likely to control the Presidency, has the shortterm incentive to favor administrative regulations as a means to an end, and thus also
has Chevron deference, while the party not in control of the executive has a tendency
to chafe under the regulations and agitate for reform.
In situations where there is unanimous control of Congress and the White House,
there may still be a preference for administrative agencies, as members of Congress
23 Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
24 Id. at 851.
25 Id. at 866.
26 See Manuel Hernandez, Comment, Running out of Gas: Why Texas Must Distance Itself Completely
from the Chevron Doctrine of Administrative Deference, 14 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 225 (2012).
27 Toobin, supra note 12.
28 Id.
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can distance themselves from administrative acts while still accomplishing desirable
policy goals. Thus, both political parties can receive many short-term benefits by
retaining the administrative state. Despite the administrative state’s fleeting utility
for political parties, in the long run, it makes politics a zero-sum game and serves to
distort incredibly the lines of accountability.
An alternative view, expressed by this Note, is that both parties are incentivized
to scale back administrative power—whether via a change to Chevron deference or
otherwise. Without Chevron deference, the playing field is leveled between the
administrative state and the other branches of government. The legislative branch is
not just the most legitimate institution for law-making, but also arguably the branch
best equipped to do so, as Congress benefits from regular elections drawing from a
diverse pool of candidates. This is in contrast to the presidency, which is dominated
by a single candidate running infrequently for office, and where a single individual’s
personal idiosyncracies can have significant effects on policy. The risk of a complete
shutout of an entire collection of ideologies representing half or nearly half of the
electorate is thus reduced and the division that would be caused is averted. Therefore,
the ruling party, currently the Republican Party, should accept—notwithstanding
concerns of constitutionality and democratic legitimacy—that it is in their long-term
self-interest to pursue legislation via legislature, and not from the Oval office.
B.

Rationales for the Administrative State

Chevron is one of the most cited Supreme Court decisions in history, and it had
no clear underpinning rationale when it was decided.29 A confluence of several
rationales were cited, and the Court, eventually in Mead, settled on the congressional
delegation theory.30 The entire administrative state, then, is predicated on the notion
that Congress has delegated to the administrative state this power. Perhaps Congress
has actually delegated this extensive power, which is unlikely. But even if Congress
has, the question is whether or not Congress could delegate this power without
violating separation of power principles within the Constitution. This Note argues
that this delegation, if such a delegation took place, is not just illegimate under the
Constitution, but also undesirable as a policy matter for reasons of democratic
accountability.
Common ground can be found, though. Many of the Court’s concerns that led to
the abdication of judicial power in the realm of administration, such as concerns of
the judiciary’s expertise and illegitimacy to resolve political questions,31 strongly
support the argument for REINs or a similar legislative effort. This Note does not
assert that the Supreme Court should have declined to give the duty of administrative
construction to another branch of government; rather, it posits that the Supreme Court
unloaded the duty of administrative construction to the wrong branch. The best
29 Chris Walker, Most Cited Supreme Court Administrative Law Decisions, NOTICE & COMMENT, (Oct.
9, 2014), http://yalejreg.com/nc/most-cited-supreme-court-administrative-law-decisions-by-chris-walker/.
30 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–233 (2001).
31 See Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). (“Judges are
not experts in the [specialized administrative field at issue], and are not part of either political branch of the
Government.”).
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branch to clarify acts of Congress is Congress, or should be Congress. Chevron did
not discriminate between administrative rulings. The smallest regulation on the
refurbishing process of a minor dam in South Dakota received the same deference as
a ruling that increased the waters under the jurisdiction of the EPA by millions of
acres and miles. To the Court’s credit, after several decades of allowing such
deference, King v. Burwell declared that not all administrative regulations are created
equal.
Next, this Note asseses several of the most prominent rationales behind the
judicial abdication of statutory construction to the executive.
1.

Flexibility

One of the main reasons why this rationale has been popular, and why it was
cited in Chevron in the first place, is because of the effect stare decisis had on
administrative regulation in the lead-up to the Chevron case. When a court interprets
a regulation, its rulings are final and binding—not only to the administrative
agencies, but also to courts deciding the issue in the future. The issue at point
regarding the new installations and the “bubble concept” in Chevron had already been
decided in ASARCO Inc. v. EPA.32 It was decided that the concept could not be used
in regulations regarding air quality.33 The EPA followed this precedent, until under
the administration of Ronald Reagan they sought to employ the “bubble” concept
related to new sources once again. The circuit court struck this down, and rested their
decision on the two previously-mentioned cases. The circuit court believed the issue
had been determined conclusively six years earlier when it had initially ruled on the
matter, and decided accordingly.
It has been pointed out that the Supreme Court could have ignored this reasoning
by virtue of the lower court having no precedential power over it, but instead chose
to specifically call out and analyze this reasoning.34 Justice Stevens criticized the
appellate court’s “basic legal error” as being an adoption of a “static judicial
definition of the term ‘stationary source’ when it had decided that Congress itself had
not commanded that definition.”35 Justice Stevens here is upbraiding the circuit court
for holding its precedent as being superior to that of the new EPA interpretation,
which must be agile enough to change with the times. Chevron in this moment
ensconced the notion that the precedential supremacy of stare decisis should give way
to a “new vision of continuous, flexible, agency-directed statutory administration.”36
This notion was referenced and made explicit in the case of National Cable &
Telecommunications Service v. Brand X Internet Services.37 There, the Court said
that the “whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the

32 ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (1978).
33 Id. at 321.
34 Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1271, 1282 (2008). (“Had the Supreme Court
chosen to do so, it could have ignored the D.C. Circuit’s stare decisis argument in Chevron.”).
35 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
36 Criddle, supra note 26, at 1282.
37 Telecomms. Serv. v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.”38 The Court explained
expressly that it is “for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.”39 The Court
elevated precedent over deference only when there was a precedent that held that “the
statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains
no gap for the agency to fill, displac[ing] a conflicting agency construction.”40 The
Court here appears to prioritize administrative flexibility over statutory
standardization. Statutory ambiguities had become firmly within the control of the
executive branch.
Administrative agency flexibility and executive control over statutory ambiguity
sound like uncontroversial positives that everyone can get behind, but these positives
come with significant draw-backs. As statutory legislation becomes ever more
complex, so do the ambiguities. These “holes” in legislation can become as big as
the legislation itself—the “hole” in King v. Burwell nearly killed the most sprawling
piece of lawmaking action to come from Congress in decades.
This congressional delegation rationale for the administrative state is nakedly
utilitarian, and only provides lip-service to separation of powers. While
administrative flexibility and a lack of interference from judicial precedent may seem
like expedient means by which to create an administrative state, the merits of creating
such a state are treated as a foregone conclusion necessisated by the complexities of
the modern state. One does not need to be a formalist to accept that the powers of
lawmaking are reserved for Congress; one does not need to be a functionalist to agree
that executive regulations enabled by statutory ambiguity as enacted upset the checks
and balances between our divisions of government. If the reader believes that trained
technocrats are more able to make value-laden min-max decisions regarding every
aspect of political policy instead of Congress, then the legislature and Constitution
are already redundant. Unelected rule by administrators is entirely anthitetical to the
construction of the Constitution, and if this implicit belief underlies the reader’s
attitude towards the administrative state, then the Constitutional discussions are moot
points, as the Constitution died long ago. That is an appropriate segue for the next
rationale and critique: the idea that administrators are superior to congressmen at
making laws.
2. Agency Expertise
This underlying rationale contends that administrative agencies not only have
superior technical expertise for understanding complex administrative issues, but also
often have more familiarity with the legislative histories of their governing statutes.
Before being expressly ordered to do so in Chevron, lower courts often deferred to
administrative agencies for these reasons alone. Administrative legislation from
Congress is often written with the advice of regulators.41 It has also been noted that
38 Id. at 981 (citing Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
39 Id. at 967.
40 Id. at 982–83.
41 Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1986).
Justice Stephen Breyer remarked that agencies may have had a hand in the drafting of regulatory statutes, and
maintain close contacts with Congressional staffers.
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agencies tend to be more static than Congress, which has a constantly shifting
membership—particularly the House. Agencies, then, bring a certain desirable
institutional memory and continuity of leadership to statutory interpretation of
ambiguous provisions, and best flesh out the program’s purpose.
The expertise rationale was one that was specifically supported in Chevron. It
was noted in Chevron that technical expertise and institutional memory fed further
into the previously mentioned rationale of administrative flexibility, and that
administrative interpretations (also known as regulations) should be able to easily
change as time moves on.42 Chevron and previous cases acknowledged that judges
were not experts in the sciences or fields that the statutes concerned themselves with.
Because of this, it is most appropriate to defer—absent total and apparent
unreasonableness—to an administration’s interpretation of the statute.
This Note raises two critical comments of the expertise rationale. First, expertise
cannot possibly exist without scientists making judgments about risk, utility
optimization, and cost-benefits to society. Science is a method focused on the study
and understanding of the behavior of the physical and natural world through
observation and experiment. It is a process; an intellectual tool. Science and its
methodological training provide no method by which to gauge the value or use of the
processes it discovers. Nor does it provide a framework to judge the risk of research.
For example, it was possible for nuclear physicists to describe the effect that the
detonation of an atomic weapon would have over a Japanese city to president
Truman. They were able to accurately state the blast radius, the effect on human life,
and the residual effect of radioactivity on the land. The scientists were unable, using
purely technical expertise, to state whether or not the bombs should be dropped. The
bombs were dropped, and the justification rested in part on the calculation that overall
more human life would be spared by dropping the atomic bombs, as opposed to a
protracted land campaign in Japan.43 Even though this rings of objective, technical
assessment—one can imagine statisticians charting casualty numbers of civilians and
soldiers, and speaking in objective tones to the presidents—it rested on the value
judgment that human life should be maximized, even at the cost of innocent lives.
This claim sounds like a fundamental truth, but it is not. Informed consent, one of
the bedrock tenets of modern biological research, holds that in order to conduct
experimentation on a human being, consent must first be freely given after the patient
is educated on the risks of the experiment.44 In other words, it is widely accepted
that the benefits to mankind accrued from expedited or non-consensual human
experimentation—which are imagined to be vast—outweigh the relatively miniscule

42 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984). “The fact that
[the agency] from time to time changed its interpretation of the term ‘source’ does not, as respondents argue,
lead us to conclude that no deference should be accorded the agency’s interpretation of the statute.” The court
also states that implementing policy decisions occur in a “technical and complex arena,” words which suggest
that technically savvy administrators are needed to realize Congressional goals.
43 Tom Nichols, No Other Choice: Why Truman Dropped the Atomic Bomb on Japan, NAT’L INTEREST
(Aug. 6, 2015), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/no-other-choice-why-truman-dropped-the-atomic-bombjapan-13504.
44 Informed
Consent
for
Clinical
Trials,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/ClinicalTrials/InformedConsent/default.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
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loss of life from such non-consensual experimentation. Why was life maximized
objectively in the context of the atomic bomb, and not maximized in the arena of
informed consent? These are difficult questions that scientists, by virtue of their
training and experience, are no more able to answer than you or I. These are
fundamental questions.
That agencies have a superior understanding of the technical processes as well
as the legislative intent, and thus are more able to realize the value judgments of
Congress, is not persuasive. While this could be true, it is also equally true that there
exists no check or balance to police the agencies’ realization of legislative intent.
This is dangerous, even if agencies are operating in good faith to honestly enact
congressional will. Even a brief history shows that the true cause of a changing of
agency interpretation is due not to a shifting understanding of science, or
experimentation, but rather due to the executive in power at the time being averse to
the value judgments of the Congress that created the statute. Chevron itself was born
of one agency interpretation, one of many agency interpretations of its like, that was
promulgated via the Reagan administration to counter what the administration
viewed as an onerous regulatory environment for industry.45 In other words, at its
core was a value judgment: that the cost to industry outweighed in a normative sense
the benefit of regulation. There was no great scientific discovery made about the
sources of pollution between the earlier ARASCO case and Chevron. It was instead
a shift in values which had its origins in the executive branch, the branch governed
by the Take Care Clause, which demands that the “laws be faithfully executed.”46
This Note does not argue that the president lacks discretion in the faithful execution
of the laws it is given. It does argue, however, that the changing of integral value
judgments via administrative agencies operates as a retroactive veto of the legislation,
violates bicameralism and presentment, and usurps Congress’ lawmaking powers in
violation of the non-delegation principle.
The second critical comment of the expertise rationale is that the Court’s
reasoning in Chevron directly supports REINs’ underlying logic, which is itself not
opposed to technical expertise, but merely seeks to find an appropriate place for it.
This Note does not dispute that agencies have superior technical training and
experience than an average judge or member of Congress, and even cautiously
accepts the notion that administrators at these agencies have a greater knowledge of
the legislative history and purposes of the statute. It agrees with Chevron in this
regard, but proposes strongly that this expertise be reserved as advisory for Congress.
In the same way that the physicists could explain the effects of the atomic bomb to
president Truman, who possessed the authority and democratic legitimacy as
commander-in-chief to decide the use of that bomb, the agencies and their
administrators are perfect for describing the cause-and-effects of certain
administrative decisions. For example, if the word, “source,” were to trigger a REINs

45 Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1565 (2005); see also Illya Somin, Gorusch
is Right About Chevron Deference, WASH. POST. (Mar.25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/25/gorsuch-is-right-about-chevrondeference/?utm_term=.df8786e15765.
46 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5 (emphasis added).
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procedure by virtue of its economic cost, then elected representatives could hear
testimony on the “bubble” theory of sources of pollutions, and other theories, and
hear from administrators on their thoughts of the legislative purpose. Congress could
then make an informed opinion in full view of the electorate. In all likelihood,
Congress, like the judiciary before them, would defer to the judgment of the
administrators. It is the instances when they do not, however, that this Note and
REINs are concerned with. It will not be the judiciary clarifying ambiguities, opening
itself to criticism of legislating from the bench, and it will not be the executive branch
essentially ignoring the Take Care Clause of the Constitution and exercising a
retroactive veto. It instead will be Congress, whom all agree has the power to create
intensely technical statutes in the first place and are the most politically accountable
of the three branches, which brings us to our next rationale.
3. Political Accountability
This rationale holds that if statutory interpretations contain normative questions
of value and judgment, then agencies associated with the executive branch should
decide the issue instead of the judiciary. This is a recurring theme, and it is the
rationale for Chevron that this Note supports the most, though there are criticisms. It
has been said that the federal judiciary “have no constituency”47 and they “have a
duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”48 This is valid, and
supports the inference that when regulations are massive enough to kick in a REINs
procedure that the appropriate branch to clarify the ambiguities is Congress, instead
of the president.
This rationale derives its support from the unitary executive theory—that the
president has the popular and constitutional mandate to insert policy into all
administrative decision-making.49 This Note does not dispute that the president has
more accountability and democratic legitimacy than the judiciary, but it does dispute
the extent of control the president actually has over certain agencies or administrators.
The president exercises authority over the federal bureaucracy, but many important
decisions and powers are within the hands of independent agencies or administrative
law judges. Additionally, there are many thousands of career administrative staff that
will serve multiple presidencies and are not accountable to the people. The unitary
executive theory is interesting because it can be seen to circularly defeat itself. As it
stands, it is likely that many major regulations come from agency formulation and
not presidential policy directives, thus giving them low levels of legitimacy. If the
inverse were true, that the president operated massive control over all agency
formulations, then not only would the previously mentioned technical expertise
rationale be undermined, but the executive itself would resemble what has been called
a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”50 Critics of the unitary executive theory are
47 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
48 Id.
49 For a comprehensive review of the history of the Unitary Executive theory, and its relationship to the
administrative state, see Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
50 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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familiar with the constitutional and political problems of an omnipotent president,
and when his or her power is increased exponentially by the apparatus of the
administrative state, these concerns become even deeper.
4. Implicit Delegation
This theory maintains that the reason the courts are showing deference to the
administrative regulatory agencies is because the ambiguity in the statutes is actually
Congress consenting to administrative agencies filling in those “statutory gaps.”
Thus, the democratic legitimacy of Chevron deference is that, by writing statutes
ambiguously, or by being silent on potential issues, Congress has tacitly requested
that courts defer to the administrative agencies. When a statute specifically instructs
the court to show deference, then Chevron deference does not kick in—this Note
takes no exception to explicitly delegated issues. If the administrative state we have
now were the result of explicitly delegated powers that were debated in Congress in
full view of their constituents, then this Note would not exist. It was written because
the implicit delegation theory is of questionable legitimacy. In what situations in
government is silence or ambiguity considered a full yes? Is the legislative power of
the United States one such situation? It can be persuasively said that the grant of
what is effectively legislative power without de novo review from courts can only be
made explicitly, and a constitutional analogy is the amendment process; in this
process, either two-thirds of Congress or two-thirds of the state legislatures must
actively call for the amendment to take place. The silence or abstentions of
congressmen or state legislatures are not taken as meaning, “yes,” to the proposed
amendment, so why should that rationale extend here?
This rationale is the rationale the Supreme Court most strongly endorsed in the
case of United States v. Mead Corp, a later case dealing with Chevron deference.
Professor Criddle, a supporter of Chevron deference who supports a theory that a
confluence of rationales mentioned here converge to support Chevron, critiques the
interpretation.51 He mentions that one of the best justifications for the delegation
theory is actually a post hoc rationale: “the best argument for the congressional
delegation theory may rest on legislative inaction; namely that Congress has not
intervened to suppress Chevron’s revolution.”52 In what is perhaps most telling to
the legislation that this Note concerns itself with, Professor Criddle went on to state
that “[u]nless Congress speaks more plainly to the issue in the future, critics’
discontent with the congressional delegation theory is unlikely to subside.”53 REINs
would be Congress speaking to the matter, and would be a perfectly formed death
knell to the congressional delegation theory, the rationale embraced in United States
v. Mead Corp.54 Nothing can possibly counter the idea of tacit delegation more
strongly than an act of Congress saying the delegation does not exist.

51
52
state.
53
54

Criddle, supra note 26, at 1282.
Id. at 1286. (emphasis added). The revolution referred to here is the creation of the Administrative
Id.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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This Note has so far criticized the rationales for the administrative state,
especially in the context of deference towards large regulations that would trigger
REINs procedure. It will now analyze the judicial analogue to REINs—King v.
Burwell. When a “major” regulation triggers REINs, the question is put before
Congress. Under King v. Burwell, the Court has allowed major regulations (defined
as those of “deep economic or cultural significance”55) to bypass Chevron deference
and go to the judiciary for construction. This is not an ideal situation, as the
preferable check on administrative fiat exists within the legislative branch, not the
judiciary.
III. KING V. BURWELL, AND THE UNWORKABILITY OF THE MODERN
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
King v. Burwell56 was one of numerous pieces of Supreme Court litigation to
arise out of Barack Obama’s sweeping healthcare reform initiative, The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”). Decided in June of
2015, it is a perfect recent illustration for showing the range of issues currently being
raised by the intersection of the federal administrative state, congressional legislation,
and federal court oversight. This case has been chosen to appear in this Note for two
specific reasons. First, it is an example of a bipartisan Supreme Court majority
(including Justices Kennedy and Roberts) adopting a much less deferential tone of
Chevron deference, refusing to grant such deference to ambiguous wording where
the question was one of “deep economic and political significance.”57 Second, its
complexity makes it a perfect case-study of the difficulty courts have in construing a
statute while maintaining their judicial prerogatives, and the need for a solution to
come elsewhere (such as from Congress, on which the U.S. Constitution has
conferred lawmaking powers). As the Supreme Court slowly creeps back into
overseeing regulations, the current tyranny of administrative regulation will have the
dubious benefit of a body of several different layers of appointed, unelected lawyers
weighing in with their views.
Indeed, there were no fewer than five different opinions of what the instant
sections of the Affordable Care Act in Burwell really meant and how the meaning of
those sections should be treated. Of those five interpretations, Congress remained
uninvolved, and the average citizen (along with this humble law student) remains
utterly befuddled. Here is a brief recapture of the several interpretations: 1.) The
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), which promulgated the first opinion as to what the
sections meant; 2.) the federal district court, which held that the sections clearly
meant tax credits would be available in federal exchanges and that the IRS rule was
redundant;58 3.) the appellate court, which held that the sections were actually
ambiguous and thus the IRS rule would be treated deferentially as per Chevron;59 4.)

55
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58
59

King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 2480.
Id. at 2483 (internal quotations omitted).
King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415, 439 (E.D. Va. 2014).
King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 376 (4th Cir. 2014).
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the Supreme Court majority, which held that despite the sections being ambiguous,
the IRS would not be given Chevron deference, but that the rule would stand anyways
as a matter of statutory interpretation;60 5.) and, finally, the Supreme Court minority
which stated that the rule was ambiguous, should not receive Chevron deference, and
was not reasonable.61 Despite the previously mentioned congressionally penned
legislation on bison and building names, this is how the law is made in the United
States of America. It is technocratic, highly bureaucratic, with numerous layers of
debate by persons none of whom are directly accountable to a single voter in the
United States.
This is exactly as convoluted and unworkable as it appears. If several of the main
purposes of our system of laws is repose, predictable outcomes, and notice of how to
follow laws, then in many regards our current system is failing. It is a mishmash of
“pure applesauce,” as Justice Scalia wrote famously in this dissent (even though his
dissent only added to the applesauce).62 This brings us to the third reason this case
is included in this Note: its complexity perfectly highlights that the majority has
already adopted something similar to SOPRA and the Court itself has moved away
from the previously near-inviolability of Chevron deference (which may hint at
further erosions in the future). Fourth, despite the Court’s seeming embrace of
SOPRA, the stark, sometimes scathing, differences between the majority and
minority’s interpretation of the statute show that a legislative remedy for ambiguity
is preferable on grounds of democratic legitimacy. In short, King v. Burwell is a
complex case based on complex litigation, with a series of judicial decisions so
confused as to verge on the schizophrenic. This perfectly illustrates the need for a
legislative solution. At least when a legislature is confused and contentious, they
have to own up to it.
A.

Background and Explanation of Affordable Care Act Legislation

The basic point at issue in King v. Burwell was whether or not federal income
tax credits extended to individuals in states that had federally-created, and not statecreated, healthcare exchanges.63 Some background on the Affordable Care Act is
required. Health insurance costs and availability have long been a major political
and economic issue in the United States. Over the years, several states enacted pieces
of legislation that compelled guaranteed issue and community rate.64 Guaranteed
issue bars health insurers from denying coverage to any person because of his
health—including pre-existing medical conditions. Community rating requirements
mandated that health insurers give, within a given territory, the same health insurance
price to all individuals without health underwriting. This essentially barred health
insurers from charging more to the individuals with the pre-existing conditions or
health problems that they were forced to accept under the guaranteed issue
60
61
62
63
64

Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2484.
Id. at 2497.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See generally id.
ANTHONY T. LO SASSO, PHD, COMMUNITY RATING AND GUARANTEED ISSUE IN THE INDIVIDUAL
HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET (2011).
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requirements. These reforms at the state level greatly expanded health insurance
coverage, but at the expense of causing a phenomenon known as a “death spiral.”65
The combination of guaranteed issue and community rates incentivized people to
only purchase health insurance when they became sick. The result was a rise in
premiums, a resulting decrease in people buying insurance, and private health
insurance exiting the markets in a death spiral of increased costs and lower
profitability. In the mid-2000s, Massachusetts introduced what became a powerful
counter to the death spiral: along with guaranteed issue and community rate
guidelines, the state also mandated an individual health insurance coverage.66
Individuals would be required to maintain health insurance, the cost of which would
be offset by tax credits made available to certain individuals (typically those of lower
and middle incomes). Those who did not maintain insurance would pay a penalty.
This legislation in Massachusetts was specifically enacted to counter the death spiral
seen in other states. The combination of these reforms, guaranteed issue and
community rate, a coverage requirement, and tax credits for eligible individuals
succeeded in expanding health insurance access and avoiding the dreaded death
spiral.67
The Affordable Care Act sought to replicate the success of the Massachusetts
system on the federal level, and adopted analogues of many of the key reforms found
in Massachusetts. First, the Act adopted both the guaranteed issue and community
rate reforms in order to increase access to private health insurance for individuals.68
Second, it more or less required that all individuals in the country maintain health
insurance or pay a penalty (read later to be a tax)69 to the IRS. Individuals whose
health insurance payments would comprise more than eight percent of the
individual’s income were exempt from buying health insurance or paying the
penalty.70 Third, the Act adopted a similar program of tax credits to offset the cost
of mandatory health insurance purchases for individuals. Individuals whose
household incomes fall between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line are
eligible to use their health insurance premiums as a tax credit.71 The Act aped the
Massachussets method in many ways, but its national scope necessitated some
improvisations. The most notable of which, and the cause of the litigation, was the
setting up of health insurance markets on a state-by-state basis.
An Exchange is a marketplace, typically online, where individuals may browse
and compare private health insurance packages. This is where the statute becomes
less straightforward. The Act requires the creation of “an Exchange” in every state in
America.72 If states opt not to create their own Exchange, then the federal
government will establish “such Exchange.”73 As to tax credits, the Act states they
65
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Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2482.
Id. at 2486.
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See 42 U.S.C.S § 300gg (LexisNexis 2017).
Nat’l Fed. Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012).
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Id. at 2491.
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“shall be allowed” for any “applicable taxpayer.”74 The tax credits will only be
available if the taxpayer is enrolled for health insurance through “an Exchange
established by the state under 42 U.S.C. § 18031, 36b.”75 The IRS, to which the
penalty tax will be paid, promulgated regulation 45 CFR 155.20, which states that
the tax credits will be made available to an Exchange “regardless of whether the
Exchange is established and operated by a state.”76 The IRS rule sought to clarify
the statute with a regulation. This clarification, which gave rise to the present
litigation, would have great importance to the Affordable Care Act because thirtyfour states have opted for the federal government to establish health insurance
Exchanges through the HHS. The plaintiffs in the case at issue were individuals of
the state of Virginia, which had opted to have a federally created system, who would
be exempt from the penalty and the coverage requirement because it would comprise
more than eight percent of their income, without the tax credits. With the tax credits
it would comprise less than eight percent of their income, and they would have to
purchase coverage or pay the penalty.
What follows is an analysis on how the courts dealt with the uncertainty created
by the statute’s directive of a creation of “such an Exchange” by the federal
government if the states opted not to do so, and the seemingly limited nature of the
tax credits to only those Exchanges “established by the State.” Keep in mind the
overarching policy goals of avoiding the death spiral of rising insurance premiums
and offsetting the costs of mandatory purchases for qualified individuals.
B. The Majority Opinion: Unworkability, and the Implications on Precedent
Firstly, and most importantly, the majority opinion, despite finding that the
statutory wording was ambiguous, did not grant Chevron deference. The Court
instead chose to interpret the statute de novo, without regard to an agency’s
interpretation. This is strikingly similar to the purpose and effect of SOPRA,77 with
a key caveat being that the Court would only ignore deference to agencies in regards
to questions of high political and economic significance. Despite the problems
surrounding this standard, which include the questionable legitimacy of an unelected
Court to decide what is politically and economically important, the standard may also
prove low and still empower Chevron deference in all but the most massive decisions.
SOPRA goes a step further than this, removing it entirely. The majority’s analysis is
a great example of how the Court would construe a statute in a world where SOPRA
has been enacted, and, taken with the dissent, is a good example of why perhaps
another step past SOPRA is needed in the form of REINs (which would immediately
trigger congressional approval for the major questions that the Court here decided do
not deserve Chevron deference). Without REINs also being enacted, the confused
and sometimes scathing opinion above would become the norm of settling major
questions of law under SOPRA.
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The justifications for not applying Chevron deference in this case are similar to
the justifications for supporting REINs. The Court here found that the IRS Rule was
not deserving of Chevron deference because of its deep political and economic
significance.78 It noted that Chevron deference is predicated on the basis that
Congress implicitly delegated power to regulatory agencies to fill statutory gaps, but
that would be inappropriate here as this gap is simply too large to be seen to be
delegated.79 It is worth stressing that it is unlikely that such a delegation regarding
tax credits in the Affordable Care Act would ever have been delegated to the IRS,
which has no particular expertise for formulating healthcare policy. This suggests
that the congressional delegation theory still has legs, but no matter how it is read,
King v. Burwell was a narrowing of Chevron deference by the Supreme Court.
The Court in Burwell seemed to apply a “filtering” test similar to what REINs
requires. While Chevron deference was not overturned in King v. Burwell, a bar, or
more accurately, a filter, was applied to it. When a rule addressing a statutory
ambiguity is challenged, instead of deference to the administrative agency (so long
as the rule is reasonable), courts will now decide whether or not the rule was deeply
significant. Lack of agency expertise and the importance of the rule compared to the
goals of the statute seem to be relevant factors in deciding whether Congress
implicitly delegated authority to the agency. Here, tax credits were important
precisely because they were part of the statutory scheme aimed entirely at preventing
a death spiral in the insurance industry following issue and rate reforms. When these
factors are significant, the Court construes the statute, not the agency. But is this
adequate and justifiable?
REINs proposes that in this almost exact scenario—when an ambiguity of
significance is decided by administrative rule—Congress, not the Court, should
approve the administrative construction of the statute. This is desirable for several
reasons. As the preceding section showed, construing statutes from the bench is no
easy business and yields unpredictable results. If Congress had the ability to construe
their own statutes when the REINs requirements are met, then predictability would
return to the law. The political parties that dominate Congress have regularly
published agendas of how they will act, whereas the Court has only intermittently
published agendas, called decisions, and they are difficult to predict.
Accountability is a major reason why Congress, not regulatory agencies or the
Court, should make decisions of deep significance stemming from statutory
ambiguity. Were this particular IRS rule kicked back to the Republican controlled
Congress at the time under REINs, then a majority of both Houses would have never
approved the measure. Thus ends the tax credit provision of the Affordable Care Act.
This seemingly harsh result may stir some readers’ political beliefs, but I urge that
you look to the legitimacy of such a decision, not its result.
Imagine if an executive agency interpreted a statutory ambiguity to empower the
deportation of millions of undocumented immigrants utilizing new, controversial

78 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015).
79 What about the Clean Water Act regulations? How about the FCC’s designation of the internet as a
utility provider? Don’t these seem to be deeply economically and politically significant? King v. Burwell has
implications for future sweeping regulations such as this.
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methods that may or may not have been allowed in the original legislation. Congress
is held by the opposition to the president, and when the reinterpreted rule is kicked
back down to them under REINs, they fail to approve it, the tactics are not used, and
mass deportations are prevented, as they desired. Congress answers to their voters for
that decision. Similarly, imagine that Congress is held not by the opposition but by
supporters of the president—the only difference is that they now must sign off on the
rule adopting the controversial methods, and assume accountability to their voters for
the results. The result is the same: Congress is accountable again to the democratic
process and democratic legitimacy is preserved.
The Court in King v. Burwell construed a question regarding a statute that was
of admittedly “deep . . . significance.”80 The overall position of this Note, SOPRA,
REINs, and the majority and minority in King v. Burwell is that administrative
agencies lack legitimacy to make decisions that have the same impact legislation
would have. What legitimacy does the Court have to do the same? The Court is
certainly more desirable as they have received more vetting by elected officials than,
say, an associate trade commissioner. But the Court nevertheless has found itself the
propagator of decisions that undoubtedly are legislative in effect. Indeed, many such
decisions came from the court for the same reasons that sweeping regulations came
from the agencies: legislative gridlock. Justice Scalia once critically referred to the
Court as acting like a sitting body of Philosopher-Kings.81 I disagree. The Court
more closely resembles a body of Charlatan-Diviners, who spend thousands of hours
and pages attempting to divine the purposes and meanings of a legislature that exists
in human form less than a mile away from them. Giving a non-political institution
authority over sprawling political issues necessarily politicizes that institution, and
Congress has certainly given that power to the Court. It was not usurped from them,
it was freely given. The connection between the people and the laws as enacted are
so attenuated that it verges on the comical. Voters elect representatives, who then
write broad and ambiguous laws because they want to deflect blame if something
goes wrong. These laws are then clarified by unelected bureaucrats appointed and
vaguely overseen by the executive branch. These clarifications are reviewed (or
maybe not, post-King v. Burwell) by a series of courts who disagree with themselves
at every single level regarding the same set of facts, and who use intellectual tools
with names such as, “surplusage constructions,” to support their disagreements. All
of this is done in order to divine the meaning of what a voter from Michigan, Hawaii,
or California, consented to. It reads like a twisted national game of telephone, where
each passing level of removal from the voter further twists the word that the same
voter has spoken. This removes the voter from the process and further stokes
discontent and apathy.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This Note concludes that a move away from Chevron deference may already be
underway by the Supreme Court. But that is an imperfect solution to the overly
80 Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2483.
81 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989).
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powerful administrative state. The move from Chevron deference, be it from the
Court or from SOPRA, is only desirable if REINs is also enacted. This is because
under SOPRA—or its arguably looser judicial analogue, King v. Burwell—the Court
will still provide clarifications of ambiguous provisions of statutes that have “deep
political and economic significance.” These “clarifications” of major provisions are
no less than lawmaking. The Court, though having more legitimacy than agencies to
decide such issues, is still an imperfect decider of what decisions the nation makes in
regards to deep political and economic questions. The same questions of legitimacy
that dog an administrative agency decision arising from a statutory ambiguity will
also dog any major Court decision resolving the ambiguity. The answer is before us:
REINs. Congress will have the opportunity to clarify the ambiguity and be
accountable for that clarification, thus preventing two undesirable results: 1.) a
clarification due to an untouchable amount of deference from an unelected agency,
and 2.) a clarification due an untouchable amount of deference from an unelected
Court.82
Congress under both parties has given its responsibility away by its silence on
ambiguities and its purposefully vague drafting to launder culpability, relegate
political debate to the “comments” section of the Federal Reporter, and accomplish
substantive goals at the cost of substantive process. REINs, if passed, would be a
complacent Congress taking that power back and it would be doing so for the benefit
of the people who elected it. No longer will Congress be incentivized to write and
hide behind ambiguous provisions. No longer may they launder their culpability for
their own legislation by punting the tough questions to administrative agencies which
are, at best, creatures of the executive. No longer may they count on the Court to
serve as the guards to Capitol Hill, closing off challenges to ineffectual laws through
rules such as Chevron deference. And no longer may they count on the Court to
legislate from the bench using methods of analysis that are incomprehensible to the
people whose consent the federal government supposedly relies on to exist.
Many feel as if there is something wrong, a formless dread floating across all
parties, ideologies, and demographics. A feeling that something is just not quite right
with our Republic. If the majority feel disenfranchised, then who is enfranchised?
The answer has been in front of us for some time: no one is enfranchised. Institutions
have proliferated, accountability has been laundered, and the organs of the federal
government exist independently of the body politic. Under REINs, the buck stops
with Congress once more. Are they up for it? How long can our Republic sustain
the weight of this laborious system of work dodgers, Charlatan-Diviners, petty-king
bureaucrats and grasping executives? A structural problem requires a structural
answer. Consider this.
REINs is not the end-all be-all solution to the administrative state. Indeed, if an
administrative state is not seen by the reader as being illegitimate—either
constitutionally or in terms of democratic legitimacy—then REINs may certainly be
considered a disaster. It is, however, profound in its simplicity, and profound in its
effect. It would be the legislature turning aside not only one of the most cited cases
82 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“ It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”) (emphasis added).
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in Supreme Court history, but it would also be reorganizing the very balance of power
in our government. This should not be undertaken lightly. REINs could undergo a
different form. The dollar amount for triggering the procedure may be increased or
decreased. Special categories of “fast-track” regulations, such as those dealing with
national urgencies or defense, may be exempt from the provisions. A possible fear
of REINs is essentially that Congress is incompetent, and that nothing would ever get
done in this country if Congress had to clarify certain major administrative questions.
To be fair, Congress is likely seen as incompetent precisely for the reason REINs
needs to be passed; it has abdicated power. But even so, this nation’s two tiered
system of federal government with checks and balances was not made to be a hyperefficient or hyper-agile administrative state. If we are to continue to be a nation
bound by the Constitution, resisting short term expediency at the expense of longterm liberty, like Odysseus who asked to be bound to the masts of his ship to resist
the call of the sirens, the administrative state must either be rejected or legitimized.
This Note calls for either a rejection or a full legitimation, and a subsequent change
of Constitutional jurisprudence, in favor of an administrative state. It is not only
more honest, but it is this author’s sincerest belief that the only fount of power for
government exists from the consent of the people it governs. Let the people have a
chance to see what representative democracy looks like in the 21st Century. If they
are horrified by the result of REINs, if fears of government ineffectuality are realized
and the people judge this loss of efficiency as being more detrimental than their loss
of enfranchisement, then let them choose. For agencies to take this power and for
the Court and Congress to show deference to the theft, or to close its eyes, cannot
stand.
The final assertion of this Note is the most important: there are greater values at
risk than efficiency, or even liberty. The Author asserts that the administrative state,
and the flowing of power to the executive branch over the course of decades, has
been the cause of the severe and deep political division America now faces. Politics
has become a zero-sum game: the presidency. Even with minorities in state
legislatures, governorships, and the national Congress, a political party can
accomplish successfully large policy programs to the disappointment or horror of half
of the nation if they control the presidency. The administrative state is an effective
counter-majoritarian tool.
If presidential elections were a stock, then analysts would say that it has a high
beta, or high volatility. Elections are infrequent. One candidate, who is liable to die,
or to be compromised, or to be disappointing, is invested with all the hopes and
dreams of a nation.
Said explicitly, what many Democrats saw as a tool to get things done with a donothing Congress during president Obama’s second term is now a tool for Donald
Trump to gracefully execute his own personal reform—a reform that Republicans in
Congress can applaud, or not applaud, whatever is convenient for their district, as
they do not have to vote on the most controversial matters.
This Note takes no position on any specific political policies, but does point out
that it will only be the most recent example of the administrative state being leveraged
against the United States as a whole, without check or balance from the other two
branches of government.
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When a twice-a-decade election effectively can decide the fate of our nation, an
election subject to flukes and miracles, and an administrative apparatus readily exists
for a president to subject his policy on the body politic with no recourse by the
governed, tyranny reigns. And from tyranny comes populism, and from populism
more tyranny still. The political process is undermined, faith in institutions continues
to decrease, and voters will funnel their discontent into the election of the
increasingly omnipotent president, chosen during an election cycle as vicious and as
high-stakes as we have ever seen. The administrative state is responsible for the
partisanship we see now. As this pendulum of control over the admistrative apparatus
swings every several years, the nation’s policies on both wings of politics becomes
increasingly radical. There is no incentive in the United States to be moderate. A
two-party system creates a binary choice; you have to be just slightly more acceptable
than your opponent and you can earn a vote from a moderate…or at the very least
quash the moderate’s turnout. The very comity of our nation depends on the
legislative branch being restored its power and, more importantly, being restored its
responsibilities. Never in our history has one individual successfully carried the
hopes and dreams of this nation, and it is naïve or even dangerous to expect that to
change.
Consider that.

